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Abstract 
With its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union has begun to develop a 
further ring in a widening set of economic policy regimes that gravitate around it. There are now no less 
than six rings to this system. We observe that the EU economic regime has extended its outreach to all 
categories of countries but the degree of acceptance of EU economic norms and the speed of adoption of 
EU economic rules is diminishing in the areas further away from the EU core. In the immediate vicinity, 
the EFTA ring, a high level of economic standards existed prior to the countries’ full inclusion in the 
single market and the mechanisms of acquis enforcement have been modelled on the EU’s internal rules 
and procedures. In the outer rings of lower economic standards, the EU has been more successful in 
encouraging convergence on its economic norms in countries to which it has extended the membership 
perspective. The promise of full integration in the EU has legitimized the EU’s external governance 
through conditionality to steer the course of economic transition in the candidates and potential 
candidates. In the ENP ring, the EU has excluded the mega-incentive of accession as member state and 
this has decreased the possibilities for exerting strong leverage over the ENP partners. The evolving EU 
economic relationship with the southern and eastern neighbours is less hierarchical in nature and more 
based on mutual agreement and cooperation. In the outmost ring occupied by Russia, we see the EU 
reaching the geographical limits of its economic influence. Generally, the EU gravitational pull is getting 
weaker in the more distant periphery and the EU instruments are shifting from more traditional methods 
of hierarchical governance to softer modes of horizontal cooperation. 
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ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT 
EXTENDING THE EU’S NORMS OF ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE INTO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD 
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA & MICHAEL EMERSON 
1. Introduction 
With its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the European Union has begun to develop 
a further ring in a widening set of economic policy regimes that gravitate around it. There are 
now no less than six rings to this system. The first ring is the ‘old EU’, which first defined in the 
1980s and then applied in the 1990s the rules of the internal market and economic and monetary 
union. This stock of laws, norms and rules became known as the ‘acquis communautaire’, i.e. 
meaning effectively the ‘acquired jurisdiction of the European Community’.  
In a second ring the EU’s internal market was extended to the EFTA states, to form the 
European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994, with adoption of virtually the whole of the internal 
market acquis. This was a case of extension of the system to states with the most advanced 
governance standards. 
The third ring saw extension of the acquis to the new member states acceding in 2004. In this 
case the new member states from central and eastern Europe were at the same time completing 
their regime change out of communism.  
The fourth ring consists of the Western Balkan states, which are not yet accession candidates, 
and for whom the Stabilisation and Association process (SAA) was devised. This involves a 
substantial but less complete or rapid adoption of the acquis,  but the political incentive of 
accession to the EU in the long term is still present. These are also cases of post-communist 
regime change, but with the addition of severe post-conflict and state building agendas.   
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), initiated in 2003, thus represents the fifth and 
largest ring, embracing six former Soviet Union states of eastern Europe (excluding Russia) and 
the ten south Mediterranean states of the Barcelona Process. This also involves the post-
communist transition for the post-Soviet states, but the same policy is addressing the culturally 
different challenges of modernisation of the Arab world. Both groups of states have serious 
weaknesses of political and economic governance to resolve, and the EU acquis is only 
selectively being introduced, depending on the will and aptitudes of each state individually. 
Most of the European neighbouring states look for a long-term perspective of EU accession, but 
this is not encouraged by the EU itself.    
Last but not least, Russia occupies alone the sixth ring, with a set of ‘common space’ 
agreements signed with the EU in 2005. These are more limited still than the ENP in 
commitment to convergence on EU norms, and there is no demand by Russia for EU 
membership perspectives, but there is a more ambitious geo-strategic content.   
This paper focuses mainly on the emerging ENP, but places it in the perspective of the other 
rings in the EU’s spectrum of arrangements for exporting its norms and rules of economic 
governance. The comparison between these several regimes, all belonging to the same family, 
allows us to examine both the extent and limits of this complex and growing process. Looking 
across the rings, we observe that the EU economic regime has extended its outreach to all 
categories of countries but the degree of acceptance of EU economic norms and the speed of 
adoption of EU economic rules is diminishing in the areas further away from the EU core. In the 
immediate  vicinity,  the  EFTA  ring,  a high  level  of  economic standards  existed  prior to the 2 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
countries’ full inclusion in the single market and the mechanism of acquis enforcement have 
been modelled on the EU’s internal rules and procedures. In the outer rings of lower economic 
standards, the EU has been more successful in encouraging convergence on its economic norms 
in countries to which it has extended the membership perspective. The promise of full 
integration in the EU has legitimized the EU’s external governance through conditionality to 
steer the course of economic transition in the candidates and potential candidates. In the ENP 
ring, the EU has excluded the mega-incentive of accession as member state and this has 
decreased the possibilities for exerting strong leverage over the ENP partners. The evolving EU 
economic relationship with the southern and eastern neighbours is less hierarchical in nature and 
more based on mutual agreement and cooperation. In the outmost ring occupied by Russia, we 
see the EU reaching the geographical limits of its economic influence. Generally, the EU 
gravitational pull is getting weaker in the more distant periphery and the EU instruments are 
shifting from more traditional methods of hierarchical governance to softer modes of horizontal 
cooperation. 
A further part of the system of external influences bearing upon these states comes with the 
projection of norms and rules of economic governance by the International Financial 
Institutions or IFIs (principally in the present context the IMF, IBRD, WTO and EBRD). In 
general terms the mix of influence of the EU and the IFIs varies as a function of the strength of 
the EU integration factor, with the IFIs fading in significance for EU member states, but 
remaining as important actors in other parts of the European neighbourhood. How best to blend 
the EU’s acquis and the Washington consensus in the European neighbourhood becomes a 
major issue for the policy makers.  
2.  Shaping the rules of economic governance in the old EU 
The EU’s own internal system of economic governance has been analysed in both the economic 
literature focusing on the substance and economic rationale of EU policies
1 and the political 
economy literature concentrating on the modes of economic policy-making.
2 A great deal of the 
economic decisions of EU governments have come to be constrained by the economic 
competences transferred to the EU level, in particular in trade, competition, monetary and 
several sectoral policy areas, and commitments made to coordinate other aspects of their 
economic policies. Yet, regardless of the EU layer of governance, there is substantial discretion 
left to the national governments to preserve their national economic features that continue to co-
exist with the common economic policies. Member states have, for instance, opted for a wide 
range of policies with respect to the extent of state involvement in the economy compatible with 
EU competition policy, on the speed and extent of privatisation, on the level of social protection 
and taxation, and the degree of rigidity or flexibility of labour market regulation.  
The evolution of the EU economic system has since the 1970s alternated between advances in 
the macro and micro-economic domains, with the pursuit of monetary union and completion of 
the single internal market. The 1970s saw first attempts to move fast towards monetary union 
                                                 
1 See for instance Daniel Gros (ed.). Fiscal and Monetary Policy for a Low-Speed Europe (Brussels, 
Centre for European Policy Studies: 2002). Daniel Gros, Thomas Mayer and Angel Ubide, The Nine 
Lives of the Stability Pact (Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies: 2004). Daniel Gros, Thomas 
Mayer and Angel Ubide, EMU at Risk (Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies: 2005).  
2 See for instance Ingo Linsenmann and Wolfgang Wessels, “Modes of Economic Governance in the 
EU,” paper presented at the conference “Economic coordination in EMU,” College of Europe, Brugge,  
28-29 June, 2002. Stefan Collignon, 2003. “Is Europe Going Far Enough? Reflections on the Stability 
and Growth Pact, the Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s Economic Governance,” European Political Economy 
Review (1, No. 2): 222-247. ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 3 
 
with the Werner Plan, but these foundered on the monetary instability provoked by the first oil 
shock of 1973. This failure led to criticism of an excessively monetarist approach, and neglect 
for the public finance redistribution function in all advanced Western economies, be they federal 
or unitary states. This led to the influential MacDougal report, which provided analytical 
underpinnings for subsequent demands that monetary integration be accompanied by an EU 
redistribution function.
3 The late 1970s saw a re-launch of monetary integration ideas by 
Commission President Roy Jenkins, which led to the birth of the European Monetary System 
under the leadership of Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d’Estaing. However at the 
beginning of the decade long presidency of the Commission by Jacques Delors in 1984 the 
priority switched to completing the single market, with the target date of 1992.
4 Only after this 
project was assured did EU leaders return to the monetary union question in earnest, embracing 
the logic that ‘one market’ needed ‘one money’.
5 The norms and structure of the emerging 
system was sketched in a report by a group of experts commissioned by President Delors and 
headed by Tommaso Padoa Schioppa.
6 The literature traces the increasing relevance of the EU 
layer of governance in economic policy formulation in the member states since the Single 
European Act of 1987, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, particularly in the eurozone member states.
7  
The first feature of the EU’s approach to economic governance is encoded in the internal market 
regime, with regulatory norms and methods adopted in a comprehensive range of EU common 
policies, such as for technical product standards, indirect taxation, competition policy, transport, 
environment, energy, etc. The programme to complete the internal market by 1992 required no 
less than 300 legal acts, which became the heart of the ‘acquis’, defining the basic rules and 
standards in the specific sectors. They are tightly linked to the liberal economic logic 
underpinning the internal market and the ‘four freedoms’ constituting its core – the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour. The progressive empowerment of the EU 
institutional structures, considered by many analysts a key factor for the progress in market 
integration, has been at the heart of conceptualisations of the EU economic governance as a 
supranational system.
8  
A second distinct feature of the EU governance practice is agreement on a limited redistribution 
function, aiming at strengthening the economic and social cohesion across borders. There is an 
explicit commitment to “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions, including rural areas”
9 among the 
                                                 
3 D. MacDougall et al., “The Role of Public Finance in European Economic Integration,” (Brussels, 
European Commission: 1977). 
4 Michael Emerson et al., The Economics of 1992: The E.C. Commission's Assessment of the Economic 
Effects of Completing the Internal Market (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1988.) 
5 Michael Emerson, Daniel Gros et al., One Market, One Money (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1992). 
6 T. Padoa Schioppa et al., Efficiency, Stability and Equity – a Strategy for the System of the European 
Community (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1987). 
7 See Stefan Collignon, 2003. “Is Europe Going Far Enough? Reflections on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s Economic Governance,” European Political Economy Review (1, 
No. 2): 222-247. 
8 See for instance Simon Bulmer, 1997. “New Institutionalism, the Single Market and EU Governance,” 
ARENA Working Papers, WP 97/25. 
9 Art. 130a, Treaty Establishing the European Community. 4 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
member states. The agreement on substantial regional and structural funds in the common 
budget is the concrete instrument for promoting cohesion.
10 
This emerging blend of economic liberalism and social cohesion is a basic reflection of the 
EU’s preferred range of socio-economic models, which while quite wide, can still be contrasted 
with the more liberal model observed in the United States. The concrete emergence of the EU’s 
blend of market liberalism and social cohesion policies can be attributed historically and 
personally to the Cockfield-Delors tandem. Thus on the one hand the ultra-liberal Lord 
Cockfield, sent to Brussels by Margaret Thatcher, saw to the liberal fundamentals of the 1992 
programme. On the other hand, the socialist Jacques Delors was convinced that neither the 
single market nor the single currency could be politically viable for the EU without a substantial 
set of social cohesion policies, which in practice translated into a massive development of the 
EU’s regional and structural fund instruments.
11  
With the launch of the EMU, the European Central Bank was empowered to maintain price 
stability within the Eurozone economy. The rules governing decision-making in monetary 
policy exhibit features of ‘traditional’ governance with a firm treaty base and institutionalisation 
at EU level.
12 The common currency and the single monetary framework are the third feature of 
the EU economic governance system. The criteria set to ensure the convergence of 
macroeconomic policies of governments prior to membership in the EMU, known also as the 
Maastricht criteria, constitute the consensus among the member states on the basic principles of 
macroeconomic governance such as low inflation, sustainable public finances and external 
accounts, a transparent and predictable environment for economic agents.  
Box 1. The Maastricht Criteria 
Inflation - no more than 1.5% above the average inflation rate of the lowest 3 inflation countries   
Interest rates - the long-term rate should be no more than 2% above the average of the three countries 
with the lowest inflation rates  
Budget deficit - no more than 3% of GDP 
National debt - no more than 60% of GDP 
Exchange rates - currency within the normal ERM bands with no re-alignments for at least 2 years  
 
These elements of supranational governance in the economic domain, however, co-exist with 
softer mechanisms of policy coordination.
13 These rely less on hierarchical methods and formal 
rules and sanctioning procedures, and more on horizontal coordination through common 
benchmarking, target setting and voluntary implementation.   
The main elements of real supranational governance, as in the single market acquis and the euro 
currency controlled by the independent European Central Bank, are thus flanked by a complex 
set of economic policy coordination methods, of varying hardness or softness, and of varying 
                                                 
10 See Pascal Lamy, 2004. “Europe and the Future of Economic Governance,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 42 (1): 5-21. 
11 T. Padoa Schioppa et al., “Efficiency, Stability and Equity – a Strategy for the System of the European 
Community” (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1987).  
12 See H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.). Policy-making in the European Union. 4
th edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).  
13 See Adrienne Heritier,  “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-making without legislating?” In 
A. Heritier (ed.), Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance (Boulder, CO: 
Rowman  & Littlefield, 2002). ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 5 
 
effectiveness too. At the macroeconomic level, the Stability and Growth Pact is an attempted 
example of ‘hard’ coordination in the area of fiscal policy.
14 It is a framework for regulating the 
fiscal behaviour of member states by putting limits to government spending and debt levels.
15 It 
includes a budgetary surveillance mechanism with a legal procedure for penalising governments 
in breach of the common rules, based on treaty provisions.
16 In contrast, the annual Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the employment policy present models of ‘soft’ 
coordination.
17 They are not legally binding frameworks and work on the basis of policy 
monitoring and policy recommendation without formal sanctions in the case of non-compliance.  
The ‘hardest’ part of the Stability and Growth Pact – its budget deficit constraints – came to the 
hard test of a reality check in 2003-2004 when several member states were into breach of their 
budget deficit commitments. France and Germany in particular reacted by defying compliance, 
complaining of the excessive rigidity and restrictiveness of the rules. Instead they demanded 
revision of the rules, to render them more flexible and accommodating with respect to 
circumstances permitting overshooting budget deficit limits. The Council (ECOFIN), legally 
authorised to impose financial sanctions, fell short of penalising its two largest member states at 
the end of 2004
18 and the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact were subsequently softened in 
June 2005.
19 
At the micro-economic level, the so-called 'Lisbon Strategy', launched in 2000, set the target of 
2010 for the EU to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”.
20 The Lisbon Strategy is based on a highly detailed benchmarking of performance 
indicators, subject to annual review at summit level. It is as an example of the ‘open method of 
coordination’, seeks to achieve results through lessons learning and sharing of best practices, 
and raising the domestic political costs of poor performance, rather than through applying 
detailed norms at EU level.
21 
The Lisbon Strategy was initiated because of the disappointing growth performance at the heart 
of the EU, principally of the founding member states. The combination of ‘one market’ and ‘one 
money’ had been expected to translate into a significant boost to growth. The conclusion drawn 
from the failure for this to emerge was not so much that the EU-level economic regime was 
defective, but rather that the founding member states were failing in their domestic policies to 
                                                 
14 Ingo Linsenmann and Wolfgang Wessels, “Modes of Economic Governance in the EU,” paper 
presented at the conference “Economic coordination in EMU,” College of Europe, Brugge, 28-29 June, 
2002. 
15 See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam, 17 June 1997, 
OJ C 236, 02/08/1997. 
16 See Council Regulation No 1467/97 of July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 209, 02/08/1997.  
17 Ingo Linsenmann and Wolfgang Wessels, “Modes of Economic Governance in the EU,” paper 
presented at the conference “Economic coordination in EMU,” College of Europe, Brugge, 28-29 June, 
2002. 
18 See Daniel Gros, “The Stability Pact is dead! Long Live the Treaty?” CEPS Commentary, January 
2005, available at www.ceps.be.  
19 See Council Regulation No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation No 1467/97 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 174/5, 7.7.2005.  
20 See Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23-24 March 2000. 
21 See Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer, 2004. “New Governance in the European Union: A 
Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (1): 121-42. 6 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
face up to the challenges of globalisation, compared to the US, Asia and the smaller and newer 
member states of the EU (from Ireland and the Nordics to Central and Eastern Europe).  
Assessments of the effectiveness of all these coordination mechanisms to bring about policy 
convergence and good economic outcomes are mixed to say the least. The Growth and Stability 
Pact was challenged in 2004 by both France and Germany, and as remarked above the rules 
were promptly changed to become more accommodating.
22 The Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines are a set of policy recommendations, without teeth. The Lisbon agenda is recognised 
to have been over-ambitious in its objectives, over-complex in its specific targeting, and short 
on real political action by the member states. Nonetheless the EU economic governance system 
has been experimenting in the design of new coordination schemes on an unprecedented scale. 
The EU economic governance system, therefore, is a mix of modes of governance. The EMU, 
the Single Market regulatory norms, including the social dimension to support the less 
developed areas, and the ‘hard’, ‘soft’ and ‘open’ coordination mechanisms in other economic 
areas all form part of the EU economic governance framework. It is a patchwork system of 
national and supranational elements, of macro-economic and micro-economic policy 
components, yet a system with a constantly evolving European dimension that has affected 
governance structures at national level. Together it forms a certain culture of European 
economic governance that shapes the discourse and expectations of the EU representatives when 
dealing with the European integration aspirations of neighbouring non-member states.  
3.  Exporting the rules of the internal market to the EFTA states 
The EU’s first important act of export of its economic regime was initiated by Jacques Delors, 
when the internal market programme was becoming credible, and the EFTA states with their 
very deep level of trade integration with the EU feared that they could become relatively 
disadvantaged. Delors for his part wanted to avoid a cascade of new membership applications 
from these small states, and so offered them a formula for guaranteeing full access to the 
internal market. The conditions for this were wholesale adoption, with implementation through 
their domestic legislation, of all the 300 legal acts of the EU to complete the opening of the 
market. The EU and EFTA states were thus to become joint members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). It was also agreed that the EEA would be a dynamic jurisdiction, in that 
the EFTA states accepted an open-ended obligation to adopt further domestic laws to implement 
subsequent developments of EU internal market, which have turned out to be of large 
importance especially in the service sectors. 
From a political standpoint the EEA involved the highly democratic EFTA states accepting the 
legally binding specification of their internal economic policies by the EU on a grand scale, 
without any power to join in the policy shaping process at all.
23 This extreme experiment with 
‘democratic deficit politics’ had several results. First attempts were made to give some dignified 
institutional means for the EFTA state to participate in policy shaping and legal implementation. 
Committee structures were set up for consultations over new EU legislation. An EFTA Court 
was set up in Luxembourg, alongside the European Court of Justice, to rule over legal disputes. 
This interesting innovation involves judges from EFTA states making binding rulings on the 
implementation of EU law in their states, a system that could only conceivably work where the 
officials of the partner states enjoyed the highest trust for their competence and loyalty to the 
intentions of the EEA. In addition, an EFTA Surveillance Authority watches over the legal 
                                                 
22 Daniel Gros, Thomas Mayer and Angel Ubide, EMU at Risk (Brussels, Centre for European Policy 
Studies: 2005).  
23 Michael Emerson et al., 2002. Navigating by the Stars: Norway, the European Economic Area and the 
European Union. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 7 
 
transposition of EU directives and publishes twice yearly the Internal Market Scoreboard 
measuring the success of the EFTA countries in implementing the Internal Market legislation. 
The latest results show that the EFTA countries have closed down their transposition deficit and 
have even achieved a better implementation rate compared to the EU member states (see graph 
below). 
Figure 1. Transposition deficit for EFTA States, EU 15 and EU 25 as of 30 April 2005 
 
Source: EFTA Surveillance Authority (2005) Internal Market Scoreboard – EFTA States. 
Second, notwithstanding these noteworthy efforts, the democracy deficit in the system was too 
much for the Swiss, who voted against ratification of the EEA Treaty by referendum. As a result 
Switzerland fell back to a position of negotiating a selective but increasingly extensive set of 
agreements with the EU on various sectors of the internal market, and other policies such as 
recently the Schengen system for free movement of persons. The EU however for its part was 
not willing to see Switzerland establish an important ‘cherry-picking’ precedent for ‘importers’ 
of its economic system, and insisted upon a guillotine clause, whereby if Switzerland failed by 
referendum to implement one of the agreements all of them would be rendered null and void. 
Also Switzerland ended up with a weaker position institutionally than the EEA states. 
Third, Finland, Sweden and Norway, soon after ratifying the EEA, decided that the democracy 
deficit was too uncomfortable for them too, and that the better option was to request full 
membership. As is well known, of the three Norway failed to ratify accession by referendum, 
and so fell back into the original EEA with only Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
The EEA experience, while governing only small populations, is nonetheless rich as an extreme 
experiment in the export and import of economic regimes. It is also an important reference for 
any analysis of more limited attempts for neighbourhood states to gain ‘a stake in the internal 
market’, and for the implications of the import of economic regimes for democratic legitimacy.  8 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
4.  Economic governance and the enlargement into Central and Eastern 
Europe 
The EU enlargement policy towards central and eastern Europe has often been cited as a 
successful example of EU ‘external governance by conditionality’.
24 The EU conditionality 
model of offering incentives for EU rule adoption, and disincentives for failure to align with the 
EU norms, has been credited with the pace of political and economic transformation in the 
candidate countries in the period preceding their membership in the EU.
25 Given the asymmetry 
of the EU relationship with future members, and the top-down transfer of EU rules, the 
candidate states had no choice but to take all elements of the EU governance system described 
above.
26  
The central and east European countries were relatively open to new ideas about governance 
methods and practices from the EU because they were in active search of a credible model to 
replace the collapsed communist system. In the early 1990s, the economies in the region 
suffered devastating shocks after the breakdown of the centrally planned economic structures. 
The economic objective of EU enlargement policy was to make sure that the candidate countries 
had achieved a level of economic stability and acceptance of market principles as the basis for 
economic management prior to their full exposure to competition within the internal market.  
In terms of the mechanisms for bringing about the desired economic change in the candidate 
countries, the process of rule transfer is clear-cut. The aspiring candidates had no say on the EU 
Internal Market laws, and the EU was only willing to grant temporary derogations to full 
alignment with the acquis on exceptional basis. Furthermore, the process of legal approximation 
is by definition technocratic in nature, driven by officials in Brussels and national capitals and 
with limited participation of civil society. With regard to the adoption of specific EU directives 
and regulations, the EU institutional machinery is in a hierarchical relationship above national 
governments.  
Concerning the economic criteria for accession, however, the EU’s impact on the governance 
structures of the candidate countries is not so explicit beyond compliance with EU law. The EU 
did not and could not prescribe a particular economic model to the transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, it formulated two broad economic criteria known as the 
Copenhagen economic criteria – a functioning marketing economy and capacity to cope with 
competitive pressures within the single market (see box 2) - and monitored progress towards 
their fulfilment while giving freedom to the governments to devise their specific reform 
programmes and adjustment measures.  
The two economic criteria formulated by the EU are linked and reforms intended to improve the 
functioning of a market economy contribute to its competitiveness, and vice-versa. For 
evaluation purposes, however, the Commission kept the assessment of the two sub-criteria 
separately. And although the Commission required compliance with both of them, in practice 
the ‘functioning market economy’ requirement was key to getting positive marks and 
                                                 
24 See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 
11 (4): 661-679. 
25 See Heather Grabbe, 1999. “A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for 
the Central and Eastern European Applicants,” EUI Working Paper, RCS N 12/99, Florence: European 
University Institute; Judith Kelly, 2004. “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership 
Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions,” International Organization 58, (3): 425-
457. 
26 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 675. ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 9 
 
favourable treatment from Brussels in the pre-accession process.
27 It is also the criterion that is 
“backward-looking”, taking stock retrospectively of reforms already undertaken and of goals 
already reached. The competitiveness condition is “forward-looking”, and is expected to be 
fulfilled only upon accession.
28 Indeed, the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures of 
the single market presupposes a functioning marketing economy, and comes only after a longer-
term period of sustained effort at restructuring the inefficiencies of the centrally planned 
economies.  
Box 2. The Copenhagen Economic Criteria and Sub-criteria 
“Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”   
To measure the closeness of a country to being a functioning market economy, the European 
Commission applied the following sub-criteria: 
•  consensus about economic policy; 
•  macroeconomic stability, including price stability, sustainable public finances and external 
accounts; 
•  price and trade liberalization; 
•  free market entry (creation of new firms)  and exit (bankruptcy legislation); 
•  adequate legal system, including enforcement of property rights; 
•  sufficiently developed financial sector. 
To determine the capacity of a country to cope with competitive pressures within the single market, the 
European Commission employed the following sub-criteria: 
•  existence of a functioning market economy; 
•  sufficient human and physical capital, including quality of education and infrastructure; 
•  public and private stock capital, including FDI levels; 
•  progress in enterprise restructuring; 
•  sectoral structure of the economy, including sectoral shifts between share of agriculture, industry 
and services; 
•  small and medium enterprise development; 
•  limited state interference in the economy; 
•  sufficient trade and investment integration with the EU market. 
 
Source: Headings from Regular Reports on Progress towards Accession of candidate countries. Brussels: 
European Commission.  
 
The Commission did not specify threshold levels that would clearly indicate whether a country 
has fulfilled a certain sub-criterion or not. The open-ended conditions allow for broad 
interpretation of what constitutes Copenhagen-compliant economic performance. In the absence 
of clear benchmarks, the Commission looked at the general progress in the transition process, 
focusing more on the big picture rather than details. What was sufficient in order to receive a 
good score from Brussels was a positive record of the main economic indicators over a period 
of time and a proven record of structural reforms to demonstrate their sustainability and 
irreversibility of the general economic trend.
29    
                                                 
27 Conversations with European Commission officials.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  10 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
The choices of the candidate countries concerning the precise content of macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies, however, were constrained by other external sources such as the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), which were keen on providing policy advice and financial 
resources on condition of their endorsement of the ‘Washington consensus’ as a platform for 
economic governance. In essence, there was no contradiction between the European 
Commission and the IFIs on the broad framework of economic reform. The IMF and the World 
Bank supported the EU orientation of the countries from central and eastern Europe and worked 
towards their EU membership, and they set the reform priorities in their area of specialization – 
macroeconomic policy and structural reform, respectively. The European Commission, in turn, 
accepted the leadership of the IFIs in their specific fields and complemented their programs, but 
put special emphasis on issues that are of particular importance to the EU and are related to the 
country’s relationship with it. 
The European Commission directly endorsed the IMF’s liberal approach to economic 
stabilization and growth and even co-financed it through its macro-financial assistance (MFA) 
scheme. The major precondition for the provision of such assistance is an agreement between 
the government of the country and the IMF on a macro-economic program, which means that 
IMF conditionality is built into the EU’s macro-financial package. The candidate countries 
received MFA from the EU mostly in the early days of transition of the 1990s, and strict MFA 
conditionality was absent from the late stages of substantive accession preparations.  There was 
nonetheless an implicit agreement between the EU and the IMF that the Fund would take the 
lead on macro-economic policy, given its expertise in the area and its involvement in the 
transition economies. 
The World Bank in turn added its resources to the incentive of EU membership in order to 
stimulate structural reform in the transition economies. It anchored its own programmes in the 
general EU framework, providing additional inducements linked to specific reform conditions 
in various sectors. Thus, while helping the candidates reach ‘EU standards,’ the World Bank has 
exercised its own leverage over the reform agenda of the countries. In principle, the World Bank 
conditionality complemented the EU conditionality. In practice, the World Bank’s method of 
setting concrete and often quantifiable targets went down to a level of detail in the specific 
policy areas beyond that which the EU reached with its grand approach to accession 
conditionality. 
The EU’s own Maastricht criteria, which touch upon issues of macroeconomic governance, 
played an indirect but important role in making the candidates aware of what the 
macroeconomic rules of the game were in the Eurozone. Although the EU policy is that 
candidate countries should not join the EMU immediately upon accession to the EU, and the 
Maastricht criteria have therefore not been applied in the pre-accession period, the 
macroeconomic rules of the Eurozone were already built into the expectations of the 
governments of the acceding states, most of whom favoured early joining of EMU.
30 
5.  State-building and governance in the Western Balkans 
The EU’s economic policy in the Western Balkans, i.e. states of the former Yugoslavia not yet 
accepted as member states plus Albania, is subordinated to the primary goal of state-building 
and strengthening the institutional base of the fragile state structures across the region. This is 
pursued within the political and legal framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP), which represents a preliminary stage to the process of negotiating accession that should 
                                                 
30 See Daniel Gros et al. The Euro at 25: a Special Report on Enlargement (Brussels, Centre for European 
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follow when the priority political and governance criteria are met. Economic transition is very 
much on the agenda, but after the outstanding constitutional questions have been settled, notably 
in the cases of Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro, where clear lines of responsibility for 
economic policy-making remained to be defined between sub-state entities. Post-war 
reconstruction, state- and institution-building come first. What is similar to the EU approach to 
central and eastern Europe is the conditional offer of membership, which is the strongest 
incentive the EU can put on the table, even if this may be dulled by the unspecified and distant 
time horizon. This has set the stage for a strong conditionality policy with concrete demands 
and rewards for reforms.  
Two examples, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia-Montenegro (SCG), illustrate these 
tendencies. The EU has demanded a high level of economic harmonisation between the 
constituent entities, parts of the two common states. Prior to the EU intervention through the 
SAP, the two entities in BiH in one case, and Serbia and Montenegro in the other, were seeking 
maximum independence from each other. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s progress towards a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU was made conditional, among 
other things, on a reform of the indirect tax system. This has involved the ceding of 
competences to the state level by the entity governments – most notably, the competence to 
collect taxes - and has resulted in a more integrated decision-making system for economic 
policy within the common state. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, in order to qualify for a 
SAA, Serbia and Montenegro were requested to harmonize their customs tariffs, to coordinate 
their customs services and to create the conditions for free movement of people, goods, services 
and capital between the two republics. However, the EU had to relax its requirement of a 
common external trade regime after meeting firm resistance of the governments in Belgrade and 
Podgorica. This has not meant a change in the major thrust of the EU conditionality policy in 
BiH and SCG, which has been to advance the political goal of building institutionally stronger 
common states.  
Two entities in this region, Montenegro and Kosovo, have adopted the Euro as their currency, 
renouncing both continued membership in the former Yugoslav and now Serbian dinar area, and 
creation of their own independent currencies. In addition, Bosnia has adopted a currency board 
monetary regime, with a fixed exchange rate in relation to the DM initially, and subsequently 
the Euro. The EU has in general discouraged neighbouring non-member states from unilateral 
adoption of the Euro, or ‘Euroisation’. The official economic reasoning of the EU has been that 
these states should not aspire to joining the Eurozone before being more convergent and 
integrated with the EU economy, since only then would it be safe to renounce the option to 
make exchange rate adjustments. The political reasoning was that the Euro is only for full 
member states. These arguments are not universally shared by economists, who point also to the 
advantages for weak states in borrowing the credibility of the world’s leading monetary 
regimes, either by Dollarisation or Euroisation, notably through eliminating the exchange risk 
premium in interest rates. Such arrangements are a very strong example of regime export, 
improving weaknesses in the domestic governance of the state concerned. In the two cases of 
Euroisation, Montenegro decided to go ahead unilaterally in spite of discouragement from the 
EU, while for Kosovo the UNMIK protectorate authorities agreed only because of the political 
impossibility of the dinar alternative. For Bosnia the currency board regime was decided by the 
Dayton powers.    
The Western Balkan countries, therefore, see a special category of external influence over their 
governance structures through both conditionality and direct imposition by protectorate powers. 
While the EU’s incentive is equivalent to that offered to the candidate countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe – full membership – the initial state of affairs in the Western Balkans has 
required a more targeted approach to setting country-specific conditions, penetrating deep into 
the domestic governance structures of the potential candidates.  12 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
6.  The two Neighbourhoods: East and South 
While the economic objectives of the ENP are comparable to those of the enlargement policy, 
the initial conditions in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods are quite different.   
The countries from the former communist bloc, either from central Europe or the former Soviet 
Union, have a similar domestic environment as transition economies coming out of communist 
regimes, and seeking to modernise and adapt to the market principles governing the capitalist 
economies. They were all insulated for a long time from international competitive forces due to 
the restriction of their commercial exchanges within the communist bloc market. Their 
integration into the international economic system is a major challenge for both the local 
economic agents driving the process and the public authorities supporting it through creating a 
favourable regulatory environment. The CIS countries in question - Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus. 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - have a very short history of independence and state 
consolidation, and their institutional apparatus is still far from fit to manage the enforcement of 
a regulatory framework necessary for a modern economy. The EU model of economic 
governance, which has been successful in delivering prosperity to its member states, has a 
degree of attraction and legitimacy in the eyes of the post-Soviet elites and societies. Yet, there 
is a wide variation in the openness to and acceptance of EU-inspired economic norms and 
regulatory rules among the countries from this regional group. Nevertheless, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia and Armenia all openly express their long-term aspirations for full EU membership, 
even while this is discouraged by the EU itself, especially after the referendum crisis over the 
Constitution. 
In the southern neighbourhood, however, the EU is confronted with a drastically different 
institutional and cultural setting. The Arab states are distant from the European core, 
geographically, politically, culturally and economically. The southern neighbours are 
consolidated states, mostly with authoritarian regimes, yet with mainly market economies 
exposed to at least some international competition. Most of the Mediterranean countries have 
experienced a degree of authoritarian stability in their domestic affairs in the last decades, with 
little interest in radical change on the scale of the post-communist regime changes. The southern 
Arab regimes are increasingly under pressure from Islamist political and religious movements. 
Resistance to EU-promoted ideas and governance methods can be expected to be greater than 
for the European neighbours, albeit with some countries of the region such as Morocco being 
more receptive than others to European-style values of political and economic liberalism. Israel 
is the exception in the region, with a population more interested in re-integration with Europe 
than with its Arab neighbours.   
A comparison of the level of development of the southern and eastern neighbours reveals data 
that many would consider surprising. The southern Arab neighbours on average enjoy higher 
income levels than the east European neighbours - see Table 1. For example Algeria and Tunisia 
have significantly higher GDP per capita than the South Caucasus states. Israel stands out in this 
ranking because its economic prosperity is on par with that of the EU. These comparisons are 
confirmed by data on the proportion of population living below the poverty line, with $2 per day 
taken to be the standard measure. Thus while Ukraine has a poverty ratio of 46% of the 
population and Moldova even 64%, Egypt records 44%, Morocco 14% and Tunisia 7%.   
An interesting outlier is Belarus, with the highest income level among the Eastern neighbours, 
and the lowest poverty ratio of 2%, meaning practically no poverty at all. These relatively 
positive indicators for Belarus are confirmed in a detailed report recently published by the 
World Bank.
31 The story is made all the more intriguing when taken together with the data 
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displayed in the two figures below on the quality of economic regulatory policy and the rule of 
law, which are usually fundamental indicators of the quality of economic governance. On these 
measures Belarus scores outright bottom place among all neighbourhood states, as it does also 
in measures of democracy, since its regime is the only remaining first-class dictatorship left in 
Europe. The explanation for the relatively positive economic data for Belarus is that this country 
has avoided the typical post-communist economic collapse brought about by sudden regime 
change, and its state-run economy has continued in particular to supply basic industrial and 
consumer goods to the Russian market. The World Bank does warn that this relatively positive 
experience of recent years may be difficult to sustain, as Belarus does not modernise its product 
lines, and will find international competition increasingly severe, including in the Russian 
market.
32  
Table 1. Level of Development and Poverty Rates 
Country 
GNI Per 
Capita  
(USD) 2004 
Atlas Method¹
GNI Per 
Capita 
(USD) 2004 
Purchasing 
Power Parity 
(PPP)¹ 
Population 
2003 
(million)² 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio at $2 a 
day (PPP) 
(% of 
population)³ 
Armenia   1120 4270 3.06 49  (1998)
Azerbaijan  950 3830 8.37 9  (2001)
Belarus  2120 6900 9.90 2  (2000)
Georgia  1040 2930 5.13 16  (2001)
Moldova  710 1930 4.27 64  (2001)
Ukraine  1260 6250 48.52 46  (1999)
Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Countries 
   
Algeria  2280 6280 31.80 15  (1995)
Egypt  1310 4120 71.93 44  (1999)
Israel  17380 23510 6.43 NA
Jordan  2140 4640 5.47 7  (1997)
Lebanon  4980 5380 3.65 NA
Libya  4450 NA 5.55 NA
Morocco  1520 4100 30.57 14  (1999)
Syria  1190 3550 17.80 NA
Tunisia  2630 7310 9.83 7  (2000)
Southern 
Neighbourhood 
Countries 
WB and Gaza  1120 NA 3.56 NA
1 World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2005. 
² International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, April 2005.  
³ World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2005. 
 
An estimate of the human capital stock in the two neighbourhoods is provided by data on 
educational attainment – see Tables 2 and 3. The inter-regional differences are striking with the 
eastern neighbours scoring much higher than the southern ones on all indicators. The 
comparison is all the more intriguing when put in the broader context of the EU-15 and the 
several rings of countries around it. The transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe, 
many of which are already EU member states, have comparable levels of educational attainment 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 14 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
with the top achievers from the old EU and surpass with a comfortable margin the less advanced 
“old” EU members Greece and Portugal. The average achievement in North Africa and Middle 
East is much below the average for the transition bloc, including the CIS countries from the 
former Soviet Union. Recent studies suggest a correlation between the degree of educational 
attainment and the availability of skilled and productive labour force which, in turn, is 
considered an important driver of economic and social progress.
33 The data clearly show that the 
eastern neighbours on average have better human capital stock from which  to pursue their 
development goals than southern neighbours. It should be noted, however, that the data on 
educational performance in Table 3 is based on achievement in mathematics and the physical 
sciences, where the former communist countries are particularly strong, as opposed to the social 
sciences where their stock of knowledge in Marxist-Leninist political economy has of course 
become totally obsolete.  
Table 2. Educational Indicators  
Regions  Average Years of Schooling¹  % of Population Completing 
Higher Education 
Advanced countries  9.8  13.0 
Transition countries  9.7  9.9 
North Africa, Middle East  5.4  3.4 
¹ Total population aged 25 and Over. Indicator takes into account typical duration of each level of schooling within 
countries. Source: Barro, R. and Lee, J-W. (2000) “International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and 
Implications,” CID Working Paper 42. Harvard University: Centre for International Development. 
Table 3. Educational Performance 
Groups of countries  Index of Performance² 
EU – average of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK  511 
EU – average of Greece and Portugal  450 
EU new member states – average of Czech R, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
530 
Russia  539 
North Africa – average of Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan  415 
² Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) conducted in 1995 by the International Association for 
the Evaluation of the Educational Achievement and the TIMSS-Repeat study conducted in 1999. Mean performance: 
TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat Study, re-scaled, weighted by sampling probabilities. Source: Schuetz, G., Ursprung, H. 
and Woessmann, L. (2005) “Educational Policy and Equality of Opportunity,” CESifo Working Paper 1515. Munich, 
Germany: Centre for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research.  
The economic objective of the ENP is to help the southern and eastern neighbours develop and 
modernise by anchoring their economies on the EU model of economic governance. Two 
measurements from the World Bank’s six governance indicators are particularly suited for 
assessing where the neighbouring countries stand in terms of their capacity to implement 
effectively the rules governing economic policy-making – the regulatory quality indicator and 
the rule of law indicator. The former gives an indication of the quality of policies and 
regulation, whereas the latter measures the respect of existing rules in policy implementation.
34  
                                                 
33 See Barro, R. and Lee, J-W. (2000) “International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and 
Implications,” CID Working Paper 42. Harvard University: Centre for International Development. 
34 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2004. “Governance Matters III: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2002,” Washington D.C.: World Bank. ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 15 
 
These indicators do not assess convergence on EU regulatory norms and governance practices, 
but they do give an idea about the difference in the regulatory standards between the developed 
world and the transition and less developed countries, and their regional groups. A comparison 
of data for 2004 shows that the southern Mediterranean neighbours have more advanced 
regulatory frameworks and institutions on average than the east European neighbour states. Yet 
the average level of the south Mediterranean countries is well below the average for the new EU 
member states, and further below the standards of OECD countries. The institutional weakness 
in the former Soviet Union countries is particularly striking as most of them score lower than 
the Mediterranean states on the rule of law. The most authoritarian regimes in both the southern 
and eastern neighbourhoods – Libya and Belarus – have been disqualified from inclusion in the 
ENP policy framework on political criteria, and this is illustrated in their bottom rankings in the 
governance assessments of figure 2.  
Figure 2. Regulatory Quality in the EU Neighbourhood, 2004 
 
 
Has there been any improvement of the governance structures and practices in the 
neighbourhood in recent years? While the ENP is a new instrument, the EU has maintained 
relations with the southern and eastern neighbours for about a decade now, in the framework of 
the Barcelona Process with the Mediterranean countries and in the context of the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements with the CIS countries. According to World Bank data a 
comparison of the 1996 and 2004 governance scores of the neighbours shows that most of them 
have regressed rather than progressed on both regulatory quality and rule of law.
35 The three 
Southern Caucasus countries and Ukraine have improved their regulatory frameworks, although 
starting from a very low level whereas the regulatory regimes in most Mediterranean countries 
                                                 
35 See World Bank Governance Indicators, 1996-2004.  16 | NOUTCHEVA & EMERSON 
have deteriorated. With regard to the rule of law, the situation is largely unchanged in both the 
southern and eastern neighbourhoods, but with a lot of room for improvement considering the 
low ratings of all the neighbours in comparison with the average of the advanced industrial 
economies.   
These assessments based on World Bank data are largely confirmed by the European 
Commission’s own evaluation of the economic achievements of ten years of Barcelona process 
in the Mediterranean. Using various economic and social indicators to measure the reform 
progress in the southern neighbourhood since 1995, the Commission concluded in a report 
issued in April 2005 that “…overall economic performance was rather unsatisfactory.”
36 The 
general feeling in the year of the 10
th anniversary of the Barcelona process is that it has failed to 
deliver economic development and prosperity to the southern neighbours. The economic and 
financial chapter is one of the key pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership aiming at 
creating an area of shared prosperity through a gradual establishment of a free-trade area and a 
substantial increase in the EU’s financial assistance to its partners.
37 While the EU cannot be 
blamed for the economic failures of its neighbours, its engagement in the Mediterranean has not 
produced the desired positive effect on their economic performance to date. 
Figure 3. Rule of Law in the EU Neighbourhood, 2004 
 
 
For the eastern European neighbours, the comparison with the central European and Baltic 
states joining the EU in 2004 and the South East European countries preparing for accession is 
                                                 
36 European Commission (2005), “10 Years of Barcelona Process: Taking Stock of Economic Progress in 
EU Mediterranean Partners”, Occasional Papers N 17, Brussels: DG for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, European Commission, p.19. 
37 See the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28 November 1995. ECONOMIC REGIMES FOR EXPORT | 17 
 
particularly informative, since all of them share a common economic legacy linked to the 
communist centrally planned system. The EBRD has developed a specific set of indicators for 
measuring progress in transition of former communist economies. In its 2004 Transition Report, 
the EBRD found uneven governance improvement and mixed commitment to economic reform 
across the former communist bloc 15 years after the start of the transition process.
38 Comparing 
the performance of the CIS region with the results achieved by the Central European and Baltic 
states and the South East European countries, EBRD expresses the concern that “…some CIS 
countries may become locked into a trap of weak governance, low productivity and high 
vulnerability – typical of low and middle-income countries…”
39  
Figure 4. Progress in Transition, 2004 
Transition indicators 2004: the New Member States and the 
Candidate Countries
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Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2004. Scores range from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a 
rigidly planned economy and 4+ represents the standard of an industrialised market economy.  
Legend: Initial phase reforms include price liberalisation, foreign exchange and trade liberalisation and small-scale 
privatisation.  Second phase reforms include large-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise 
restructuring, competition policy, infrastructure reforms, banking and interest rate liberalisation and 
security markets and non-bank financial institutions.  
 
 
The Report also notes that the EU membership perspective has proven the most powerful 
incentive for economic reform for accession candidate states. In the course of 2004, the 
transition economies that made the most progress are the EU candidate countries from South 
East Europe, with Bulgaria and Romania making a final push to fulfil the EU accession 
requirements, and Croatia seeking the opening of negotiations. The potential candidates from 
South East Europe (Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro) with 
somewhat longer-term membership prospects did advance their economic reform agendas too 
although with less results. The new EU member states from Central Europe and the Baltic 
                                                 
38 See “Progress in Transition and Macroeconomic Performance,” EBRD Transition Report, 2004, pp. 3-
15. 
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region have achieved a level of market reforms that put them on par with the advanced 
industrialised economies prior to their accession, but once the reward of membership was 
assured, the drive for reform has substantially weakened in 2004 compared to previous years 
(see Figure 4).  
The two EU neighbourhoods thus reveal important differences in their past economic 
trajectories and governance standards at the time when the ENP is launched. Intra-regional 
heterogeneity in terms of level of development and standards of economic governance is present 
in both regional groups.
40 It is realistic to foresee an uneven pattern of progress given the initial 
conditions in the individual partner states. 
7.  Economic Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
While the ENP is not about preparing for membership of the EU, it is closely linked to the 
enlargement process. As in the case of the EEA, the ENP is a direct response to the concerns of 
the neighbours over important developments in the EU itself. Just as the EEA was intended to 
compensate the EFTA states for their exclusion from the benefits of membership in relation to 
the internal market programme, so the ENP is intended to compensate the ‘new neighbours’ to 
the east and south for perceived disadvantages from the EU’s expansion in both central Europe 
and the Mediterranean (with Cyprus and Malta). The impetus for the ENP originated from the 
concern of some northern member states to help Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. As soon as this 
initiative began to gather momentum in 2003 the southern member states for their part insisted 
that the new northern neighbours should not receive a relative advantage compared to the 
southern Mediterranean states. As a result by 2004 the EU’s policy documents, originally using 
the term ‘Wider Europe’, came to embrace east and south with the ‘neighbourhood’ 
appellation,
41 and the first Action Plans were drafted for a selection of eastern neighbours 
(Moldova, Ukraine) and southern ones (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Palestine). The 
relationship with the enlargement process was furthered with the decision to entrust the drafting 
of the first policy papers to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement. The 
officials responsible constructed a derivative of what they had professional experience of, 
namely managing the agenda of negotiations with accession candidates, which is based on 
securing compliance with the acquis. In particular the draft Action Plans copied the structure of 
policy headings used in the accession negotiations and regular monitoring reports of the 
candidate states’ efforts. The content of the Action Plans thus have a huge number of about 300 
bulleted action points, as if compliance with all the acquis were the ultimate objective.  
Yet the specificity of the actions is very sketchy, with only selective explicit references to the 
acquis, since the neighbourhood states could not be treated as accession candidates, either as a 
matter of political choice of the EU, or the capacities of the partner states. These features are 
underlining the essential ambiguity of the ENP. It looks as if it is about the partner states 
converging on EU norms, but without the incentive of membership on the table, and with initial 
conditions very far away from the ultimate objective. As the policy advanced it has remained a 
question whether it can be regarded as an operationally viable strategy on the part of the EU, or 
just a placebo.
42  
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41 See European Commission, 2004. “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper.” COM(2004) 
373. Brussels: European Commission, May 
42 See Michael Emerson, 2004. “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?” CEPS Working 
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The primary difference compared to the accession process is the expected degree of regulatory 
convergence, the choice of regulatory norms to adopt, and the pace to implement the regulatory 
reforms. While for the candidate countries, it is a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposal, where 
governments have no choice but to harmonise the national legislation with the whole body of 
EU law, for the ENP partners, full legal harmonisation with the EU acquis is not foreseen. The 
expectation is for partial and progressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it 
makes economic sense, suits the development level and serves the development goals of the 
neighbours. Moreover, since the Action Plans are the product of joint negotiations between the 
European Commission and the partner state, there is a further degree of freedom in the choice of 
reforms that are targeted.  
Another difference is in the much greater emphasis in the ENP Action Plans on development 
objectives. For its future members the EU did not specify a required GDP or wealth level, as 
long as the right economic policy mix, largely defined by reference to EU norms, was put in 
place. The development objective, however, is much more explicit, with references to the 
country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) developed under the auspices of the World 
Bank. In poorer countries, such as Moldova, welfare improvement is singled out as a target, and 
the government is asked to take concrete measures to reduce poverty through improving the 
effectiveness of social assistance and the social safety net in general, including the social 
protection of children.
43 
The economic sections of the first wave of Action Plans for Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Moldova and Ukraine echo in their structure of headings the economic reform agenda 
from the accession process. The standard agenda has been adapted to an extent in the 
consultations processes with the partner state, to take on board national priorities and 
government preferences. The reform priorities fall under the headings of four thematic areas: 
•  Macroeconomic policies; 
•  Structural reforms; 
•  Social and employment policy, including poverty reduction where appropriate; 
•  Regional development and sustainable development. 
Compared to the provisions of the existing Association Agreements with the Mediterranean 
countries and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the CIS countries, the Action 
Plans have a higher degree of specificity and go a step further in thematically enriching the 
economic dialogue with the neighbours. However, the economic reform priorities jointly 
identified with the national authorities give only broad guidelines about desirable improvements 
in various domains. They are not of a prescriptive nature nor do they set threshold levels for 
measuring achievement.  
A further difference between the eastern and southern neighbours lies in the balance between 
the political and economic content of the Action Plans. To the extent that the notion of ‘Europe’ 
has a magnetic power of attraction in east European societies, the appeal of the EU’s norms of 
democracy and human rights is especially vivid, as the Georgian and Ukrainian Rose and 
Orange revolutions showed.  In the east, political elites can lean on the European project to 
legitimise their domestic agenda and thus build a political identity based on rapprochement with 
the Western European democracies. Correspondingly the content of the east European Action 
Plans is strong on democracy and human rights.  
This is in contrast with the southern Arab Mediterranean neighbourhood, which resist the idea 
of political conditionality and are hardly impressed by the EU’s talk about common political 
values. Instead, for the Arab Mediterranean states the economic benefits of regulatory 
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convergence with the EU has to be the prime factor to persuade ruling elites to anchor their 
economic policies in the EU framework. Moreover in the south the EU itself has been hesitant 
to pursue democratisation policies forcefully, and has emphasised economic reform, counting 
on a positive spill-ever effect from the economic to the political domain.
44 Even if this 
anticipated spillover from the economic to the political has proved illusory, the Action Plans for 
the southern neighbourhood reveal a continuation of this trend, with recommended political 
reforms limited by what is acceptable to the ruling elites. The southern governments could be 
more responsive to economic arguments and pledges for market access openings where the ENP 
has the potential to deliver.  
A recent World Bank/European Commission study provides the economic rationale that could 
win the political support of southern governments for regulatory convergence with the internal 
market, notably in the service sector.
45 The study examined the effects of bringing the 
Mediterranean partner states closer to the EU services market and argues that the potential 
benefits offered by free trade in goods, which is already programmed in free trade agreements, 
are rather modest by comparison with what could be achieved by policy reforms and 
competitive private-sector development in the area of ‘backbone services’, such as transport, 
logistics, financial services, telecommunications and electricity, as well as other service sectors 
that can profit from proximity to the EU market, such as tourism, IT services, business and 
professional services, and distribution.
46 The potential liberalisation of trade in services can 
constitute a serious offer to southern neighbours by promising to improve the competitiveness 
of their economies and by giving them a chance to profit from their potential comparative 
advantage, owing to proximity and cheap labour, in relation to the EU market. The 
Commission’s most recent policy paper, containing recommendations for reinvigorating the 
Barcelona Process to be discussed at summit level in connection with its 10
th anniversary in 
November 2005, seeks to advance along these lines.
47 For example it is recommending the 
negotiation of comprehensive free-trade-in-services agreements between the EU and the 
Mediterranean partner states, which would boost substantially the existing free-trade-in-goods 
projects. 
The economic incentives for encouraging such a process are potentially powerful, but need to be 
worked out on an operational level. The case for doing that in partnership with other external 
actors, in particular the World Bank, the IMF, the European Investment Bank and the EBRD, is 
compelling, especially given the successful cooperation between the EU and the IFIs in steering 
the transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
48 By pooling their 
financial resources and coordinating their policy advice on macroeconomics and structural 
reform, the European Commission and the IFIs can build on their existing experience and 
collectively provide the external anchor for the reform process in both the eastern and the 
southern neighbourhoods.  
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Two features of the Action Plan process suggest a less hierarchical mode of EU involvement in 
the governance structures of the neighbours: 1) the joint setting of priorities for action; and 2) 
the joint monitoring of reform performance. Partners are free to determine their own ‘level of 
ambition’ in how much they want to reform and how far they want to integrate with the 
European economy. Furthermore, the Action Plans are not legally binding documents and the 
ENP governments are not obliged to fulfil what they have agreed to. The Action Plans are an 
expression of the collective will of the EU and the respective government but deviations from 
the commitments undertaken are not subject to any formal sanctioning procedures. And because 
the EU has not specified clear incentives for reform, the potential disincentives for non-reform 
are not credible either. While the incentive-based logic of the conditionality model is not fully 
endorsed in the ENP, greater emphasis is put on the socialisation of partners who are treated as 
equals and invited to take on board certain EU norms and practices if those are considered 
appropriate. Partners are not in a position to determine the EU regulatory rules but they have 
more freedom to negotiate the import of a sub-set of those rules only. In this sense they are 
better placed than the accession candidates to define the limits of external influence on their 
domestic governance structures.  
Finally, the process of negotiating the Action Plans and of performance monitoring is 
predominantly an intergovernmental matter, which gives the central role to national 
administrations of the partner states. Yet, the involvement of civil society actors in the 
monitoring phase is not precluded – indeed it is explicitly encouraged in the Ukraine Action 
Plan. In the enlargement context, civil society actors themselves have been keen on making their 
opinions known to the European Commission as an instrument for putting additional pressure 
on their governments. Civil society activists from the new democracies in the eastern 
neighbourhood have also seen an opportunity to influence the reforms in their countries by 
voicing their concerns and independent views with EU representatives. Some have even been 
pushing for an official monitoring role of civil society groups in the review procedure of the 
Actions Plans.
49 It remains to be seen how the ENP monitoring process will be conducted but 
the possibility for innovation and unconventional approaches is there suggesting a governance 
mode different from the traditional state-centred command and control method.  
8.  A common economic space with Russia? 
The EU and Russia agreed in May 2005 documents on four so-called ‘common spaces’, one of 
which is entitled a “Common European Economic Space” (CEES), the others dealing with 
education and security questions.  
This is in principle the outermost ring of the EU’s set of economic relationships with its 
neighbours, but what does it amount to? The concrete trade interdependence is of huge 
importance, with primary commodities from Russia, especially oil and gas, being exchanged for 
goods and services on a large scale. But these trade volumes are not informative about the 
economic policy regimes that govern the EU-Russia relations. On the policy regimes some 
analogy can be made between the Swiss case in relation to the EEA on the one hand, and the 
Russian case in relation to the ENP on the other. In both cases one state of a group opts out of a 
comprehensive integration package, and negotiates a set of ad hoc agreements with certain 
notable exclusions. In the Russian case the most egregious exclusion from the set of common 
spaces is the democracy, human rights and the rule of law basket, which may be attributed to 
President Putin’s increasingly authoritarian power structure.    
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However, even leaving aside this fundamental exclusion, the four agreements that were signed 
in 2005 have been criticised by independent observers on both EU and Russia sides for their 
fuzzy content, and for being the product of bureaucratic processes with little operational and 
strategic content. The grandiose names reflect their initiation and agreement at summit level by 
the Presidents of Russia and the EU Commission and Council Presidency.
50 
The exercise in producing the common CEES document with over two years of work by 
officials reveals that the outer limits of the EU’s economic regime export process has indeed 
been reached. The CEES document is all about convergence and harmonisation of economic 
norms, but Russia has insisted in marking its difference. It does not like the ENP either for itself 
or the eastern neighbours. For itself Russia has insisted on the equal partner principle, rather 
than accepting an asymmetric and dominant EU role in norm setting, and is therefore formally 
excluded from the ENP. For the EU’s eastern neighbours that are also Russia’s ‘near abroad’, 
the ENP threatens to undermine Russia’s own ambitions to re-consolidate the post-Soviet space 
through initiatives that not coincidentally echo those of the EU. In 2000 Russia created a sub-
group of the CIS called the EurAsian Economic Community including Russia, Belarus and three 
Central Asia republics. After encountering difficulty in giving substance to ambitious 
programming documents for harmonising and integrating the economic regimes of these states, 
Russia switched its priority to creating its own “Single Economic Space” (SES) with a more 
compact core group, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and aiming at deep 
regulatory convergence and ultimately a customs union. From  the beginning Ukraine was wary 
of accepting more than free trade commitments, recognising that the customs union proposition 
would be incompatible with free trade or, a fortiori, deeper integration with the EU. Recent 
years have thus seen implicit competition between two regional hegemons, the EU and Russia, 
over their overlapping neighbourhoods. In the critical case of Ukraine as the most important 
piece in the competition, following the Orange Revolution in Kiev at the end of 2004, the 
Yushchenko regime has more categorically asserted its EU integration ambitions, and distanced 
itself from the SES initiative for anything going beyond free trade.  
Returning to the EU-Russian relations, Russia’s insistence on the principle of equal partnership 
has made the CEES document hugely ambiguous as to how the aims of convergence and 
harmonisation of products and markets will actually take place. Who will converge on whom?  
It is inconceivable that the EU will converge on Russian standards, and so the real question is 
whether the lack of explicit reference to Russian convergence on EU standards is merely a 
diplomatic discretion masking a process of real convergence, or whether the declared ambition 
is an empty political paper.  
The CEES seems destined to remain mainly in the category superficial summitry. Russia’s own 
huge windfall gains from the high price of oil and gas make the strategic outlook for the Russian 
economy more and more likely to resemble a giant case of the old Dutch disease, where other 
export-oriented industries are crowded out of world markets by the need for the natural resource 
economy to import. This will make protectionists pressures from industrial interests in Russia 
all the more persistent, and convergence on EU norms correspondingly slow and grudging.    
9. Conclusions 
The European Neighbourhood Policy stands for the time uneasily located somewhere in the 
middle ground between political fact and fiction. The export of the EU’s economic regime to the 
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EEA, the new member states and accession candidates and those in the Western Balkans that 
have acknowledged accession perspectives all belong to the world of political, legal and 
economic facts. The common economic space with Russia, on the other hand, is more of a 
fiction in policy terms, notwithstanding the importance of the commodity trade between the EU 
and Russia. 
The question whether the ENP can set in motion a process leading to better governance and 
improved economic performance in the neighbourhood therefore remains open. The outcome 
will depend on both the initial conditions in partner states and on the implementation of the 
ENP. A domestic transformation process equivalent to the economic change that took place in 
Central and Eastern European countries prior to their accession to the EU is hardly achievable in 
the ENP states in a similar time frame and without the mega-incentive of full EU membership. 
Yet there is a set of potential incentives that the EU can put on the table, most of which are in 
the economic field, and which could form the core of a finely tailored conditionality policy. The 
EU is not in a position to lead in setting the specific economic conditions in all areas, but it is 
well placed to coordinate its policies and pool its resources with other key international players 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and EBRD. Given the 
positive experience from Central and Eastern Europe and drawing on the collaborative formulas 
worked out in the enlargement context, the conditionality component of the ENP could play a 
central role in stimulating economic change in the neighbourhood.       
Yet there is still uncertainty in the ENP with regard to the links between conditions and rewards, 
or the rules determining the set of conditions to activate a certain set of incentives. The EU 
prefers to keep the ambiguity on this question, opting for “a broad balance … between the 
extent of a partner’s real progress in acting on the basis of ‘common values’ and the 
ambitiousness of the EU offer,” in the words of one of the architects of the ENP.
51 This sets the 
stage for differentiation among partners which will undoubtedly surface at a later phase of the 
implementation of the Action Plans. The delivery of rewards to best performing partners can 
create competitive peer pressure on underperformers and can stimulate them to raise the level of 
ambition of their commitments in order to receive a similar access to benefits.  
Whether the EU will be successful in triggering such competitive inter-ENP partner dynamics 
will also depend on the method of monitoring and measuring compliance with the reform 
priorities identified in the Action Plans. In the enlargement context, this was an entirely EU 
affair and the Commission in particular felt at ease giving recommendations to the candidate 
countries and criticising failures to reform. The ENP monitoring will be bi-annual and jointly 
executed with the partner state governments, which weakens the possibility for public pressure. 
In the absence of clear benchmarks, the EU will look at the general progress in the reform 
process focusing more on the big picture rather than on the concrete details. If partner 
governments demonstrate an incremental improvement of the economic situation of their 
countries, the positive evaluations will follow suit. There remain doubts, however, as to how 
critical and prescriptive the EU will be with underperforming partners.  
In general, the economic dimension of the ENP can be seen as an attempt to export the EU 
norms of economic governance to the neighbourhood. The EU is proposing to partners to learn 
from the EU’s economic experience and to align their rules with the EU’s regulatory 
framework. The EU certainly does not have a recipe for all economic problems of partner states 
nor can it maintain that it has a model of economic governance that solves all of its own internal 
problems. It nevertheless offers to partners the opportunity to emulate the path of EU member 
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states and create joint prosperity through economic integration. In essence, this is an extension 
of the internal economic logic of the EU to its external relations.  In line with its internal 
practice, the EU’s external governance methods combine ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ mechanisms of 
promoting convergence towards common economic rules. In the neighbourhood compared to 
the enlargement context, the EU counts more on partner state initiative for putting in place a 
regime of governance reflecting the features of the EU’s system and taking into consideration 
the national specificities of individual partner states.  
Finally there are three strategic reasons in the current political context why the EU should be 
motivated to give forceful effect to the potential of the ENP. The first is that, resulting from the 
referendum crisis in mid- 2005 over the draft Constitution, the EU’s perspectives for ongoing 
enlargement to include all European states that want it are now seen to be more remote. The EU 
needs therefore to find ways of enhancing the credibility of the ENP in order to lessen 
discouragement of reform-oriented policies among the fragile and poorly governed states of the 
neighbourhood. Second, and specifically for the eastern neighbours, there are the new openings 
for democratic political reform in states such as Georgia and Ukraine that need to be 
consolidated. Third, and specifically for the southern Arab neighbouring states, there is a big 
question mark as to whether these states can progress on the path of political and economic 
modernisation, and so also relegate the politics of radical Islam to the sidelines. As the summer 
and autumn of 2005 have shown, the tensions and violence emanating from the minority 
Muslim communities within the EU itself has been escalating, be it the radical Islamic terrorism 
of the London bombings or the delinquent riots of the French suburbs. The distinction between 
the internal and external is being eroded in society, and this ineluctably pushes the EU to try to 
extend the reach of its political values and economic norms.   
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